

IOEC

Iran **O**ffshore **E**ngineering
and **C**onstruction Company

THE FORTUNA RIG SCANDAL: \$87 MILLION PAID FOR BUT NEVER REACHED IRAN

UNVEILING
UNTOLD
REALITIES



The Iranian Offshore Engineering and Construction Company (IOEC)

December 2023

Research Hypothesis: The Iranian Offshore Engineering and Construction Company (IOEC) is one of the leading Iranian offshore engineering and construction companies with a history of alleged engagement in corruption. The objective is to outline the degree to which the IOEC is directly involved in corruption not only to win bids but also to ensure the completion of its construction projects despite the bevy of sanctions to which Iran is subjected.

I. Findings

1. Topline Findings

- In 2012, government entities in the Islamic Republic of Iran paid for the Fortuna oil platform, which was never delivered.
- IOEC management, which struck the deal for the platform, received extravagant salaries and bonuses.
- Chinese companies received dubious purchase orders from Iran for 30 oil platforms during the Ahmadinejad administration.

2. Identity

In 1992, IOEC emerged as the nation's first public contractor specializing in offshore projects. Tasked with a crucial role, the company was responsible for the construction and installation of offshore facilities vital to Iran's oil and gas industry. Its diverse responsibilities have encompassed project management, design, procurement, construction, installation, and the commissioning of oil drilling projects. IOEC, also known as the Marine Installations Company, is partially owned by the Oil Industry Pension Fund (51%), the Iranian Security Forces Cooperative Foundation (46%), and the company's employees (3%). The minister of oil appoints the head of the Oil Industry Pension Fund. Consequently, the CEO of IOEC indirectly assumes the position with the approval of the minister of oil.¹ The current CEO is Hosein Shiva, a former executive at the National Iranian Tanker Company and an alumnus of the IRGC's Imam Hosein University.

Mas'ud Soltanpur, a key founder of the company, had affiliations with the hardline political group Ansar-e Hezbollah. Over time, IOEC saw leadership changes, with management figures reflecting diverse political inclinations with each new administration. The majority of corrupt activities that have so far come to light, notably the missing oil platform scandal, transpired during the tenure of Ali Taheri-Motlaq, a former CEO of Iran's Ports and Maritime Organization who was appointed CEO of IOEC during the hardline administration of Mahmud Ahmadinejad (2005–13).

3. Suspected Kleptocratic Connections and Activities

The story of the missing Fortuna oil rig unfolded during the first round of sanctions in 2012, close to the end of Ahmadinejad's tenure. Due to sanctions-related challenges, the purchase of an oil rig for Iranian companies became problematic. IOEC had secured a contract during that period, winning a bid for Phase 14 of the South Pars project. To fulfill its commitments, the company needed to purchase an oil rig. The non-transparent nature of transactions during the procurement of this rig while Iran's energy sector was hampered by sanctions led to the exposure of the scandal that gained media notoriety as "The Missing Oil Rig."

In 2015, the Majles energy committee launched an investigation into IOEC to address ambiguities about the company's missing purchased equipment and the excessive salaries and bonuses of management. Reformist former MP Hosein Dehdashti, then a member of the Majles energy committee, disclosed legal violations and corruption in IOEC, including information about missing oil platforms purchased by IOEC that never arrived in Iran.

Conservative MP Ali Marvi, the chairman of the Majles energy committee, clarified that the parliamentary investigation encompassed the process through which contracts and projects were drawn up. It also included an examination of the structure and operations of subsidiary companies within IOEC, such as the Kito Company.² The initial investigation uncovered a series of violations totaling millions of dollars. The Majles investigation included a missing \$78-million oil platform, payments to private sector contractors, the discovery of another missing oil platform purchased years before the investigation but left abandoned at Sharjah port in the UAE, and uncertainty surrounding equipment purchases for the South Pars oil site.³ According to Dehdashti, IOEC issued a \$92-million payment to a front company called Dean to acquire the oil platform that was never delivered.⁴

Fortuna Oil Rig

The saga of the missing oil rig Fortuna unfolded during the aforementioned Taheri-Motlaq's management of IOEC from 2010 to 2013. During this period, IOEC, presumably on the advice of Iranian businessman Aqamorad Shirani-Takabi, entered into a contract with Sepanta International to purchase the oil rig. Owing to its Iranian connections, however, Sepanta was subject to international sanctions. This prompted oil broker Reza Mostafavi-Tabataba'i, the CEO and majority shareholder of Sepanta—jointly owned by Iran and the UAE—to establish an offshore front company in the UK named Dean a few days before finalizing the contract with IOEC in 2012. With a view to circumventing sanctions, he inked the deal for the purchase of the oil rig and its transfer to Iran. To fulfill its agreement with IOEC despite having no rigs to sell, Mostafavi-Tabataba'i and his Dean company contracted with a third party named Grup Servicii Petroliere SA (GSP), owned by a Romanian individual in Malta, to procure the rig.⁵ Ostensibly under the ownership of Mostafavi-Tabataba'i, Dean had an externally appointed CEO from Jordan named Omar Kamel al-Suwaid, presumably in a bid to conceal its connections with Mostafavi-Tabataba'i and Iran.

The total transaction amount for the Fortuna oil rig was approximately \$87 million. This sum, paid in three installments, went directly to Mostafavi-Tabataba'i's front company Dean, as follows:

- Approximately 63 million Emirati dirhams (AED) equivalent to \$17.4 million on April 25, 2012
- Approximately €30 million (equivalent to \$40 million) on October 5, 2012
- Approximately €22 million (equivalent to \$29 million) on November 24, 2012

In comments on the pricing of the missing oil rig, Mohammadreza Iravani, the chairman of the board of Dana Energy Company, presumably a rival to Sepanta/Dean, said the following: “They had proposed the Fortuna rig to us for purchase at a price between \$60 and \$65 million. We could have bought a rig that IOEC needed at around the same price. Now, the fact that they wanted to buy the \$66 million rig for \$88 million is strange.”⁶

As mentioned earlier, the Fortuna oil rig never made it to Iran. At the payment of the first installment, the Romanian company GSP, the actual owner of the rig, terminated the sales contract with Dean. Nonetheless, well aware of the termination of the contract with the rig’s owner, Dean continued to accept the remaining two payments from IOEC. A noteworthy point is that, despite the fact that IOEC never received the oil rig, the company’s CEO, Taheri-Motlaq, signed the form indicating delivery. Later, it was Bijan Namdar-Zanganeh, the minister of oil in the administration of Hasan Rouhani, who confirmed that no such rig ever entered Iranian waters in the Persian Gulf. In short, Taheri-Motlaq, fully aware of the non-delivery of the rig, authorized the payment of the contract amount from a state-owned company to Dean. This strengthens the suspicion that the primary goal of drawing up and executing the contract never was the purchase of the necessary oil rig for IOEC. Rather, the objective appears to have been the misappropriation of \$87 million from the state treasury under the pretext of circumventing sanctions.⁷

Two trials were conducted in the case of the missing Fortuna oil rig, one in a UK court and another in Iran. The Supreme Court of England and Wales sentenced the three main defendants, IOEC CEO Ali Taheri-Motlaq, his business consultant Aqamorad Shirani-Takabi, and Dean founder Reza Mostafavi-Tabataba’i, to collectively pay amounts in three different currencies for a total approximately equivalent to the sum of 79 million AED, €60 million, and £2,169,308.⁸ In Iran, the Economic Crimes Court, headed by Judge Mohammad-Hadi Fazlali, sentenced four defendants to prison terms: Taheri-Motlaq, Shirani-Takabi, Mostafavi-Tabataba’i, and Mohammad-Sa’id Hajighaffari, the CEO of Rahnemun-e Eqtesad Company. The joint defendants also included the Jordanian Omar Kamel al-Suwaid, the businessman Mehdi Vafa’ipur, and Nafiseh Mahmudi, who is related by marriage to Taheri-Motlaq and who is believed to be in Europe. They were charged with breach of trust, complicity, and embezzlement. In a 171-page verdict, the court sentenced the lead defendant, Taheri-Motlaq as the former CEO of IOEC, to three years in prison for breach of trust (through waste and misappropriation). It also invalidated the charge of embezzlement and reduced the misappropriated amount from \$91.73 million to \$87 million. The court sentenced Mostafavi-Tabataba’i as a third-tier defendant to three years in prison for breach of trust. Shirani-Takabi, a second-tier defendant, was sentenced to six months in prison, taking into account the days already served in detention. Regarding Omar Kamel al-Suwaid, the fourth-tier defendant, the court issued a “warrant of non-pursuit” due to his non-Iranian nationality and the

fact that he had signed the contract outside the territory of Iran. In the third part of the verdict related to the contract of the Rahnemun-e Eqtesad Company for 300 million tumans, the court sentenced Hajjghaffari as the company's CEO to six months in prison.⁹ Amidst the legal proceedings involving the parties implicated in the missing oil rig case, revelations surfaced through statements from one of the defendants' attorneys and documents submitted to the Iranian court by Omar Kamel al-Suwaid, the official owner of Dean company. These disclosures showed that a substantial portion of the funds Mostafavi-Tabataba'i received was contributed to Donald Trump's presidential campaign in 2016.¹⁰ In any event, a subsequent ruling by an appellate court in Iran suspended the jail terms for the defendants.

Individuals Associated with Kleptocratic Transactions

Ali Taheri-Motlaq, as the then CEO of IOEC, is identified as the buyer of the rig, while Reza Mostafavi-Tabataba'i played a significant role in the execution of the contract. Aqamorad Shirani-Takabi, a shareholder in Sepanta who was a consultant to the CEO of IOEC at that time, is among the influential figures involved in pursuing the signing of the Fortuna rig purchase contract. Despite the nominal ownership of Dean Company by Omar Kamel al-Suwaid, Mostafavi-Tabataba'i is known as the founder of the company and identified as its real owner. It is said that in a single deal involving the rig, Sepanta International received approximately \$16 million in brokerage fees for a drilling company in Iran, valued at \$420 million. Residing in Monaco and with a fondness for poker, Mostafavi-Tabataba'i occasionally conducts business from Dubai.

Another individual mentioned in the proceedings is Mohammad-Sa'id Hajjghaffari. According to Mahdi Nuddeh, the attorney representing Taheri-Motlaq, Hajjghaffari is not connected to the missing rig case, although one of the charges against Taheri-Motlaq is that he received a 300-million-tuman "consultancy fee" from Rahnemun-e Eqtesad, Hajjghaffari's construction firm. Through Taheri-Motlaq's dual role as the CEO of IOEC and consultant for Rahnemun-e Eqtesad, the construction firm secured a contract from IOEC through Taheri-Motlaq's brokerage services.¹¹

Excessive Salaries and Bonuses of IOEC Management

Another issue that came up in the Majles regarding the infractions at IOEC pertains to the exorbitant salaries awarded to IOEC managers. Former MPs Hosein Dehdashti and Amir-Abbas Soltani, members then of the Majles energy committee, unveiled a \$90,000 salary and a bonus of 60 million AED for IOEC managers. Additionally, there were revelations about payments ranging from 40 to 70 billion tumans to individuals, potentially justified as brokerage fees. In a letter signed by several MPs, the Majles reported these violations of excessive payments to IOEC managers to then-chief of the Judiciary in Iran, the cleric Sadeq Amoli-Larijani. The letter urged the judicial prosecution of Taheri-Motlaq and other individuals implicated in the violations.¹²

The Enigma of 30 Purchased Rigs from China

Iran's oil and gas landscape is marked by the involvement of foreign companies, with six rigs leased from China, one from a British company, and another from an Indian entity. What stands out is that all eight rigs operating on Iranian soil are of Chinese origin. In recent years, China has taken the lead in major oil field developments, particularly in fields like Yadavaran, southwest of Ahvaz in the oil-rich province of Khuzestan. Chinese companies now have a significant presence with their ownership of six rigs in Iran's offshore oil and gas explorations. This establishes Chinese firms as the front-runners in the category of foreign rig operators in Iran. Following closely are other foreign entities, collectively holding a total of 14 rigs, both on land and offshore on Iranian territory. Brokerage services in China for purchasing or leasing oil rigs for the Iranian oil industry have become a lucrative market. An Iranian official based in China made a recommendation to the Iranian ministry of oil to directly handle the buying and leasing of rigs through the government or the Iranian embassy in Beijing. Apparently, brokers, aiming for higher commissions in certain transactions, were driving up the prices of rigs.¹³

Amidst the unresolved mysteries of the missing rig and the drifting rig in Sharjah, former minister of oil Bijan Namdar-Zanganeh had previously alluded to the obscure story of acquiring 50 rigs from China. He emphasized the necessity for transparency regarding these purchases.¹⁴

In 2016, Abolqasem Rahmani, a former MP and the CEO of IOEC after Taheri-Motlaq, highlighted the acquisition of 30 oil rigs from China, which were unnecessary for the country but were impulsively purchased at an exorbitant price under the pretext of sanctions. Rahmani clarified that IOEC paid a \$130 million deposit but only received five oil platforms.¹⁵

The oil broker and key figure in the Fortuna case, Mostafavi-Tabataba'i, alleges that in 2011, Nafiseh Mahmudi, a relative of former CEO of IOEC Taheri-Motlaq, received €5 million from a Chinese company for an oil rig contract. According to Mostafavi-Tabataba'i, an Austrian company owned by Mahmudi entered into a \$100 million contract with the UAE-based OMC company to supervise the construction of the 30 Chinese oil rigs for IOEC. Mostafavi-Tabataba'i accuses IOEC of engaging in a \$2-billion contract facilitated by three individuals: Mahmudi, Mehdi Vafa'ipur (CEO of OMC), and the aforementioned Shirani-Takabi (consultant to IOEC). He alleges that this transaction took place without any oversight from IOEC's legal and financial departments. Mostafavi-Tabataba'i argues that due to ambiguous and questionable transactions in China, IOEC incurred losses ranging from \$110 to \$130 million in the \$2-billion contract for 10 offshore and 20 land oil platforms. The \$110–130 million represented the deposit paid by IOEC to Chinese companies, with most of the oil rigs undelivered.¹⁶

4. Significance

The entries on the aforementioned list are relatively unknown and have not received widespread attention in the public domain. Many of these instances seem to have been swiftly downplayed or removed from the media spotlight. Given the sensitivity surrounding corruption cases within the oil industry, bringing attention to these specific incidents would contribute to raising public awareness about the prevalent corrupt practices in the nation's most economically significant sector.

It is noteworthy that, according to the definition in Iranian law, conflicts of interest and the exploitation of positions—such as holding roles with conflicting interests simultaneously—are rarely explicitly classified as crimes. It is crucial to amplify these findings, as they can draw public attention to corrupt practices. For instance, individuals holding multiple positions across both public and private sectors simultaneously may potentially pave the way for the establishment of kleptocratic networks. Additionally, the absence of a transparent contract award procedure through a just and fair tender process can incentivize the formation of corrupt networks involving public companies and their private sector counterparts. This situation, particularly in key industrial positions, opens avenues for self-enrichment and raises concerns about the ethical conduct of managers involved in such practices. Shedding light on these complexities through revelations about kleptocratic practices is essential to foster a better understanding of the potential risks and challenges posed by flawed business procedures in the public sector that give rise to such malign activities.

II. Methodology

1. Sources Utilized

Our selection of sources was based on the criteria of originality and novelty. Consequently, the primary focus was on Persian sources published within Iran by reputable authors or media outlets. Any authors or outlets whose credibility could not be sufficiently verified were purposefully excluded from consideration.

To assess the credibility of sources, we conducted a thorough examination of the past performance of both authors and outlets. This involved scrutinizing the consistency and accuracy of their previous works and evaluating the extent to which their material was corroborated by other credible sources. This rigorous verification process aimed to ensure the reliability and trustworthiness of the selected sources, reinforcing the overall quality of the information presented.

2. Source Limitations

In the majority of instances, the tangible documents directly indicating instances of corruption are conspicuously absent. Depending on open-source research, the availability of documents related to contracts, meeting minutes, bills, etc., would be invaluable. The examination of such materials holds the potential to provide insights into suspicious transactions and activities that may hint at corrupt behavior, even in the absence of documentation explicitly pointing to corruption.

v. Appendix

**Given the extensive volume of findings, this dossier concentrates on significant incidents of kleptocratic activities and self-profiteering sourced from Persian publications within Iran. These sources are authored by reputable writers or presented by credible media outlets.*

A. Facsimile of the contract between CEO of IOEC Ali Taheri-Motlaq and oil broker and CEO of Sepanta International Reza Mostafavi-Tabataba'i for the Fortuna oil platform.




هو القادر
قرارداد جعاله

ماده یک: طرفین قرارداد
این قرارداد به استناد مواد ۱۰، ۵۶۱ الی ۵۷۰ و رعایت مندرجات ماده ۱۹۰ قانون مدنی جمهوری اسلامی ایران بین **جعال آقای سیدرضا مصطفوی طباطبایی فرزند سیداسد...** به شماره شناسنامه ۷۵۳ صادره از تهران متولد ۱۳۵۰ به آدرس: تهران - سعادت آباد - میدان کجاج - خیابان شهید بهقوسی - ساختمان AB.CO و **عامل آقای ... فرزند ...** به شماره شناسنامه ... صادره از شیراز متولد ۱۳۶۱ به آدرس: تهران خیابان شهید فیاضی (فرشته) - ... متعهد می گردد.

ماده دو: موضوع قرارداد
موضوع این قرارداد عبارتست از انجام خدمات مشاوره، بازاریابی، مطالعه و معرفی فرصت‌های جدید اقتصادی و برقراری تعاملات و ارتباطات سازنده از سوی عامل برای گسترش فعالیت‌های صنعتی، اقتصادی، بازرگانی، سرمایه‌گذاری و بانکی مشروع و قانونی جاعل براساس قوانین، ضوابط و مقررات جاری دولت جمهوری اسلامی ایران.

ماده سه: مدت قرارداد
مدت این قرارداد از تاریخ امضاء محدود به فسخ دو طرفه اصل، اصلاحیه‌ها، الحاقات و متمم‌های قرارداد حاضر می‌باشد.

ماده چهار: مبلغ قرارداد
۴-۱: بر اساس توافق حاصله فی‌مابین جاعل و عامل میزان حق‌الزحمه خدمات مورد اشاره در موضوع قرارداد به شرح ذیل تعیین و مقرر گردید:
۴-۱-۱: در خصوص حق‌الزحمه مشاوره در اخذ تسهیلات و کلیه عملیات بانکی اعم از اخذ وام‌های کوتاه مدت، بلند مدت، سرمایه در گردش، گشایش اعتبار، سپردن وثیقه و ... جاعل متعهد به پرداخت ۳٪ (سه درصد) کل وام و اعتبار اخذ شده به عامل پس از شروع اولین پرداخت بانک می‌گردد.
۴-۱-۲: در خصوص حق‌الزحمه مشاوره سرمایه‌گذاری و برقراری امکان مشارکت مدنی در بخش ساخت و ساز اعم از مسکونی، تجاری، اداری و خدماتی با نهادهای خصوصی، عمومی و دولتی، جاعل متعهد به پرداخت ۵٪ (پنج درصد) از میزان سرمایه‌گذاری صورت داده پس از انعقاد قرارداد مشارکت مورد نظر به عامل می‌گردد.

۴-۱-۳: در خصوص حق‌الزحمه مشاوره بازرگانی در پروژه‌های دولتی و غیردولتی اعم از خرید و فروش نفت خام، انواع فرآورده‌های نفتی و پتروشیمی، فروش انواع کالای، تجهیزات، قطعات و ... جاعل پس از کسر هزینه‌های جاری متعهد به پرداخت ۴۰٪ (چهل درصد) از سود خالص باقی مانده به عامل می‌گردد.

۴-۱-۴: در خصوص حق‌الزحمه مشاوره سرمایه‌گذاری و انعقاد مشارکت با شرکت‌های دولتی، نیمه دولتی و خصوصی در خصوص پروژه‌های مورد علاقه جاعل در بخش نفت، گاز و پتروشیمی اعم از حفاری چاه‌های نفت و گاز، توسعه میدان‌های نفتی و گازی، ساخت، تجهیز و تأمین قطعات مورد نیاز صنعت نفت و ... جاعل پس از کسر هزینه‌های جاری و تا مادامی که همکاری مشترک و منافع او ادامه خواهد داشت متعهد به پرداخت ۴۰٪ (چهل درصد) از سود خالص باقی مانده از مشارکت مذکور به عامل می‌گردد.

۴-۲: هرگونه توافق جدید در تغییر میزان حق‌الزحمه انجام خدمات مورد اشاره در موضوع این قرارداد به انضمام نحوه پرداخت آن ذیل مفاد متمم‌ها و الحاقیه‌های آتی این قرارداد تعیین و مقرر خواهد شد.

۴-۳: توافقی گردید مبلغ سه میلیارد ریال معادل سیصد میلیون تومان بصورت علی‌الحساب و جهت شروع انجام خدمات مورد اشاره در موضوع قرارداد پس از امضاء قرارداد از سوی جاعل به عامل پرداخت گردد. رسید مبلغ مذکور ظهر صفحه آخر قرارداد از سوی عامل گواهی خواهد شد.

ماده پنج: تعهدات جاعل

۵-۱: جاعل متعهد می‌گردد از افشاء مفاد قرارداد حاضر و متمم‌های آن به هر نحوه ممکن جلوگیری نماید و به مجرمانه ماندن مفاد آن اهتمام بورزد، چنانچه جاعل نسبت به افشاء عمدی و یا سهوی مفاد قرارداد حاضر و الحاقیه‌های فی‌مابین اقدام نماید متعهد به جبران کلیه آسیب‌ها و خسارت‌های مادی و معنوی عارض شده به عامل خواهد بود.

۵-۲: جاعل ضمن عقد خارج لازم که در حضور شهود امضاء کننده این قرارداد منعقد گردید حق عزل عامل، رجوع و فسخ یکطرفه قرارداد را از خود ساقط نمود.

۵-۳: چنانچه جاعل در اثناء مدت انجام موضوع قرارداد و متمم‌های الحاقی و مادامی که اقدامات عامل در هر مرحله از موضوع قرارداد به پایان نرسیده از ادامه فعالیت عامل در راستای انجام موضوع قرارداد جلوگیری نماید ضمن اینکه عامل مستحق کلیه حقوق ناشی از این قرارداد و متمم‌های الحاقی آن می‌باشد؛ جاعل متعهد به پرداخت کلیه خسارت‌های معنوی و مادی عارض شده به عامل خواهد بود.

۵-۴: اقدامات موازی جاعل در راستای انجام موضوع قرارداد و متمم‌های الحاقی و کسب نتیجه مورد اشاره در موضوع قرارداد و متمم‌های الحاقی توسط ایشان در صورتی نافذ و مانع حقوق عامل خواهد بود که قبلاً و بطور

علی‌الحساب



کتبی رضایت عامل را حاصل کرده باشد؛ در غیر این صورت عامل مستحق کلیه حقوق ناشی از این قرارداد و متصرفات الحاقی آن خواهد بود.

ماده شش: تعهدات عامل

۶-۱: عامل متعهد می‌گردد اطلاعات مربوط به عملیات شرکت جاعل را که به اقتضاء و ضرورت در اختیار او قرار می‌گیرد و یا ضمن کار به آنها دسترسی پیدا می‌کند را محرمانه تلقی نموده و از افشاء یا به کار بردن آنها در جهت خلاف منافع شرکت جاعل چه در طول مدت قرارداد و چه پس از خاتمه قرارداد جلوگیری نماید و در صورت اثبات تخلف، عامل متعهد به پرداخت کلیه خسارت‌های معنوی و مادی عارض شده به جاعل خواهد بود.

ماده هفت: شرایط فورس مازور

۷-۱: در صورت بروز هرگونه حادثه غیر مترقبه (فورس مازور) که غیر قابل پیش بینی بوده و خارج از کنترل و اراده هر یک از طرفین قرارداد باشد از جمله جنگ، شورش، سیل، زلزله، آتش سوزی، شیوع بیماری‌های مسری، اعتصاب عمومی، تغییر نظام سیاسی، حکومت، دولت و... که عدم اجرای تعهدات متاثر از فورس مازور، تصور یا تخلف محسوب نگردد پس از رفع کامل حالت فورس مازور و بازگشت امور به شرایط عادی و طبیعی طرفین به تعهدات معوقه خود عمل خواهند نمود.

۷-۲: در صورت بروز اختلاف در وقوع فورس مازور و یا تاثیر آن بر اجراء و یا عدم اجرای قرارداد عرف و قانون حاکم مرجع حل اختلاف خواهد بود.

ماده هشت: قانون حاکم و شیوه حل اختلاف

۸-۱: این قرارداد از هر حیث تابع قوانین و مقررات موضوعه جمهوری اسلامی ایران است.

۸-۲: کلیه اختلافات ناشی از تفسیر و یا اجرای این قرارداد به طریق دوستانه حل و فصل خواهد شد و در صورت بروز اختلاف در تفسیر هر یک از مفاد این قرارداد و عدم توافق و حل موضوع از سوی متعاقدین هر یک از طرفین قرارداد می‌تواند برای حل اختلاف موجود به محاکم صالحه جمهوری اسلامی ایران مراجعه نماید.

ماده نه: اقامتگاه قانونی طرفین

۹-۱: اقامتگاه قانونی طرفین قرارداد نشانی مندرج در ماده یک این قرارداد است و هرگونه اظهارنامه، اخطار، درخواست و مکاتبه در خصوص مفاد این قرارداد باید کتباً به نشانی طرفین که در این قرارداد نوشته شده و اقامتگاه قانونی آنان محسوب می‌شود ارسال گردد.

علی اوس

علی اوس

علی اوس

Endnotes

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