

TIANDY




THE USE OF TECHNOLOGY FOR MONITORING AND CONTROLLING DISSIDENTS



**UNVEILING
UNTOLD
REALITIES**

**AGENTS OF
REPRESSION
AND
OPPRESSION**



**FOUNDING MEMBERS OF TIANDY IRAN:
FARZAD NOURI AND BABAK MIR-SAEED QAZI.**



Tiandy Technologies Co.

March 2024

Research Hypothesis: Tiandy's relationship with the IRGC is bolstering the Iranian regime's capabilities to surveille and repress its own people.

RQ1: How does Tiandy support the Iranian regime's efforts to surveille and control its population?

I. Findings

1. Topline Findings

Widespread Installation of Surveillance Cameras: The Islamic Republic, with a particular focus on elements associated with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), has reportedly leveraged this video surveillance to pinpoint and pursue protesters, alongside individuals challenging the state's compulsory hijab mandate. Despite the hurdles of facial recognition technology's accuracy and the lack of an all-encompassing national database, these tools have been instrumental in the regime's efforts to track and penalize citizens based on captured footage.

International Implications and Sanctions: The international arena has cast a wary eye on Tiandy's involvement in supplying such surveillance solutions to Iran, leading to sanctions from the United States. These sanctions not only highlight the company's role in facilitating human rights abuses in Iran but also point to similar concerns in China against Uyghur Muslims. This development is a testament to the intricate geopolitical webs spun around the Islamic Republic's "Look to the East" strategy, which seeks to strengthen its ties with powers like China and Russia, especially in the realms of security and surveillance.

Use of Surveillance for Identification and Suppression: This exploration into Iran's surveillance strategies through the lens of Tiandy technology paints a stark picture of the ongoing challenges to privacy, freedom of expression, and the sanctity of peaceful protest. It further sheds light on the technological strides in state surveillance and their far-reaching implications for human rights and global diplomatic relations. **(See Appendix A)**

2. Identity

Tiandy is a Chinese manufacturer specializing in surveillance technologies. According to official newspaper advertisements in Iran, Tiandy commenced its activities in Iran since 2006. It is worthy to mention many of Tiandy's products contain chips from the well-known Intel corporation, sales of which are restricted in Iran due to American sanctions. Tiandy company collaborates with various security and law enforcement sectors of the Islamic Regime. For instance, in an archived version of its website in Iran, Tiandy explicitly has mentioned the Islamic Revolutionary Guard of the regime as one of its clients. Moreover, it participated in the International Police, Security, and Safety Equipment Exhibition (IPAS) in Tehran in 2018.

While the title of the company and its products, Tiandy, does not appear in Iranian newspaper advertisements, public documents reveal that its official representative is Faragostar Electronic Iranians (Tiandy Iran). This company has been using Tiandy's logo in its marketing activities for the sale of Tiandy's products since 2006.

However, the founding advertisement of this company indicates that its founders are Farzad Nouri (CEO) and an individual named Babak Mir-Saeed Qazi. An online profile of Babak Mir-Saeed Qazi suggests that he is associated with institutions such as various divisions of the IRGC (such as the Joint Staff and the Naval Force), governmental entities, banks, and foundations like the Executive Headquarters and the Astan Qods-e Razavi, which is under the supervision of the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic.

In July 2023, it was reported in Iranian media that a gathering of the Tiandy extended family, including special representatives of Tiandy in Iran, Fartak Global Vision Company, Ati Negar Electronics, and all Tiandy representatives from different cities, was held at the Rayzan International Conference Centre in Tehran. During this gathering, Fartak Global Vision Company (Farko) was introduced as the new representative of Tiandy in Iran. Ati Negar Basir Electronic, with a long history in the field of surveillance and security systems, was also introduced as the Gold Partner and business partner of Fartak Global Vision in the exclusive distribution of Tiandy brand products.

It is essential to note that Tiandy is one of the few companies whose products are used in large-scale projects such as refineries and large factories, as well as in medium-sized projects such as cameras in villas, small offices, and commercial units. Therefore, it has targeted a broad audience and has a significant presence in both small and medium-sized projects in Iran. Tiandy's strategic maneuvers in the surveillance market paint a vivid picture of a company on a mission to broaden its footprint and sway across the globe, particularly by catering to the needs of authoritarian governments keen on clamping down on opposition and dissent. This expansion is not just about selling state-of-the-art surveillance gear; it's about forging deep ties with key state and security players in places like Iran and China, where surveillance morphs into a pivotal pillar of governance.

The company's willingness to entangle itself with entities facing international sanctions unveils a complex web that stretches across various layers of supply and political ambition. It's a realm where Tiandy doesn't just supply technology but becomes enmeshed in the broader geopolitical game, influencing and being influenced by the high stakes of international relations and statecraft.

Delving deeper into the ramifications of Tiandy's endeavors, we uncover a troubling trend towards the dilution of privacy and human rights. In territories where the iron fist of authoritarianism prevails, the deployment of advanced surveillance tech acts as a tool not just for monitoring but for actively quelling any form of resistance or critical expression. Through this lens, Tiandy's participation in such network's sheds light on the intricate dance between tech suppliers, state security mechanisms, and the erosion of fundamental freedoms. It's a stark reminder of the challenges faced by global human rights defenders and policymakers in navigating the murky waters of technology's role in surveillance and control. **(See Appendix B)**

3. Suspected Kleptocratic Connections and Activities

The concerns spotlighted by the utilization of Tiandy's surveillance technologies in Iran, especially in terms of identifying and stifling dissent, shine a light on deep-seated issues of potential corrupt practices and power abuses. Here's a closer look at these suspected activities and their broader implications:

Surveillance and Suppression of Dissent: The strategy employed by the Iranian government, which involves setting up surveillance cameras from companies like Tiandy to spot and quell protesters, is a glaring example of technology being twisted for political subjugation. Such actions are not just about keeping an eye on the public; they target individuals engaging in protests or defying the compulsory hijab laws, casting a shadow over the ethical use of surveillance.

Collaborations with Authoritarian Regimes: Tiandy's dealings with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), a major player in Iran's security and military sectors, and its provision of surveillance gear paints a concerning picture of private enterprises entangled in state mechanisms of oppression. This entanglement begs a serious debate over the role of corporations in perpetuating human rights violations.

Evasion of International Sanctions: The discovery of Intel chips in Tiandy products, amidst strict U.S. sanctions that block the flow of American tech to Iran, hints at a sophisticated game of dodging international regulations. This scenario suggests the existence of intricate networks involving subsidiaries and partnerships, all designed to mask the true destinations and uses of these technological products.

Each of these points not only underscores the ethical quandaries faced by companies like Tiandy in their international dealings but also prompts a critical examination of how technology can be exploited by authoritarian regimes to cement their power, often at the cost of human rights and dignity.

Standard Against Which Actions Are Judged to be Corrupt:

Iranian Domestic Laws and Institutions: Under Iranian law, the actions of state institutions, including the IRGC and police forces, in employing surveillance technologies for political repression, could be justified under national security and public order rationales. However, the

legality of such actions does not necessarily align with international human rights standards, which Iran has committed to through various treaties.

Violations of Existing Legal Codes: The deployment of surveillance technologies for the suppression of lawful dissent and the enforcement of compulsory hijab laws without clear legal parameters for privacy and data protection likely contravenes international human rights laws, including the right to privacy, freedom of expression, and peaceful assembly. The utilization of Tiandy surveillance technologies by the Iranian government for the suppression of protesters and enforcement of compulsory hijab laws raises significant concerns under international legal frameworks, including violations of treaties and agreements upheld by the United Nations. This practice contravenes several fundamental human rights enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), to which Iran is a signatory. The employment of surveillance to monitor, identify, and subsequently suppress dissent directly infringes upon the rights to privacy (Article 17 of the ICCPR), freedom of expression (Article 19 of the ICCPR), and peaceful assembly (Article 21 of the ICCPR). Additionally, the targeted suppression and identification of individuals based on their participation in protests or non-compliance with state-imposed dress codes violate the principles of non-discrimination and equal protection under the law (Article 26 of the ICCPR). The international community, through mechanisms such as the United Nations Human Rights Council and treaty bodies, has the mandate to scrutinize and call for accountability in such cases where state actions deviate from international commitments to uphold human rights and fundamental freedoms.

Iranian Cultural Norms: The use of surveillance technologies to enforce social norms, such as compulsory hijab, and to suppress political dissent, may be seen as an overreach by the state into personal freedoms, deviating from cultural norms of privacy, autonomy, and community solidarity that are valued within many segments of Iranian society.

The actions of the Iranian government and Tiandy in employing surveillance technologies for political repression demonstrate a pattern of practice aimed at maintaining control over the population and suppressing dissent. This has not only impacted the individuals directly targeted but also has broader implications for civil liberties and human rights in Iran. The revenues from these activities likely support the continued operation and expansion of the state's surveillance and security apparatus, further entrenching the power of the IRGC and other security forces.

The benefits of these corrupt acts extend beyond the immediate actors to support the broader infrastructure of an authoritarian regime that restricts freedoms and violates human rights. The involvement of companies like Tiandy in these practices underlines the importance of due diligence and ethical considerations in international business dealings, especially in contexts with significant human rights concerns. **(See Appendix C)**

4. Significance

Tiandy Technologies stands out in the global market as a beacon of advanced surveillance technology, notably for its facial recognition systems and surveillance cameras. This prominence is underscored by its pivotal role in equipping various sectors with cutting-edge surveillance tools, from enhancing urban security to more targeted uses like monitoring public spaces and aiding law enforcement efforts.

Public Reputation and Known For:

Tiandy has carved out a reputation as a leading powerhouse in the surveillance tech arena, originating from China but now serving a global clientele. This has positioned it among the elite in the CCTV and surveillance technology sphere.

The spotlight has also shone on Tiandy for its dealings with authoritarian governments, particularly its supply of surveillance tools to the Islamic Republic of Iran. Here, its technologies have been implicated in quashing dissent and enforcing rigid social mandates like the compulsory hijab.

Novelty of Findings:

The specifics of Tiandy's involvement in Iran, particularly the depth of its engagement and the targeted use of its technologies for stifling protests and enforcing governmental edicts, might come as news to many outside the surveillance industry circle.

While some might anticipate the misuse of surveillance tools given the global market dynamics, the detailed account of how Tiandy's products are woven into the state's surveillance and control strategies could offer fresh perspectives on the extent of their application.

Conformity or Defiance of Public Expectations:

To critics wary of the potential misuse of surveillance technologies in environments where human rights are on shaky ground, the deployment of Tiandy's tech in Iran as a mechanism for protest suppression and social control might not be surprising. This situation embodies a quintessential example of how technology can be twisted to strengthen the state's hold over personal liberties.

Conversely, for those less versed in the nuances of surveillance technology's role under authoritarian regimes, these revelations might challenge preconceived notions, illuminating the degree to which such technologies are now cornerstone tools for enforcing conformity and quelling dissent.

Tiandy's stature as an innovator and key player in the surveillance technology field is well established, yet the detailed exposure of its complicity in state-driven suppression activities in Iran, and possibly elsewhere, introduces a profound layer to its public image. These revelations bring to the forefront the complex interplay between technological advancement and the ethical, as well as human rights, implications of using such technologies in ways that encroach upon individual freedoms and rights.

The importance of this research can be categorised as follows:

1. The introduction, identification and spotlight on Tiandy and its products hold considerable importance for several reasons:
2. Collaborative entities and representatives in Iran: It is possible to identify subsidiaries and partners of this company and their colleagues and such companies.
3. The operational methods, features, and capabilities of Tiandy in identifying protesters on the streets;
4. The limitations and potential shortcomings in accurately identifying protesters (primarily due to the lack of a comprehensive database and image archive of all Iranian citizens); Reporting and sanctioning of companies helps identify disruptions to the government project
5. The introduction of Tiandy as a security partner for authoritarian political regimes, serving in the suppression of citizens not only in Iran but also in China.
6. Diminishing citizens' fear of receiving messages related to not having/ inappropriate veil
7. Providing a clear image of the legitimacy crisis in the system and the failure of the local informants network, which compels the government to resort to technology for the identification and repression of protesters
8. Establishing a framework for identification and disgrace for Tiandy collaborators and its advertising apparatus within Iran
9. Introduction of modern repression techniques: perhaps most importantly, introducing innovative forms of repression, pressure, and intimidation using new technologies and contemporary science in closed and authoritarian systems.

II. Value for Civic Activists

Compelling research findings are typically insufficient to spur well-implemented advocacy campaigns. This section describes how activists could employ the research findings to achieve the objective(s) of their targeted anti-corruption advocacy.

This section deconstructs the methodology and anticipates/counters potential criticisms.

1. Pertinent Activists

The insights gleaned from examining Tiandy's surveillance technologies and their role in oppressing and identifying dissidents in Iran are of immense value to a wide spectrum of activists and civil society organizations. These groups are distinguishable by their geographical nexus to Iran—spanning those situated within its borders and others operating from afar.

In-Country Activists and Organizations

Human Rights Activists and Legal Aid Organizations: These groups are at the forefront of documenting abuses of power and offering legal succor to those ensnared by the state's

watchful eyes and heavy hand. They champion the cause of accountability for human rights infringements and push for legal reforms that enshrine privacy and freedom of speech.

Women's Rights Groups: Zeroing in on the compulsory hijab mandate, these activists stand for women's sovereignty over their bodies and their right to self-expression. They strive for the repeal of laws mandating the hijab and an end to its surveillance-driven enforcement.

Diaspora Entities/Individuals

International Human Rights NGOs: Operating on a global stage, these bodies spotlight human rights atrocities and advocate for international intervention. Their goal is to harness global pressure to usher in reforms within Iran.

Technology and Privacy Advocacy Groups: These groups delve into the exploitation of technology for suppression, advocating for a clampdown on the sale of surveillance tools to oppressive regimes. They envision a world governed by international norms that forbid the export of surveillance tech that tramples on human rights.

Advocacy Objectives and Desired End State

The collective advocacy aim for these entities is to cast a spotlight on and counteract the deployment of surveillance technologies for tyranny, with an ultimate vision of a society where civil liberties are upheld, and surveillance tech is divorced from political subjugation. The aspirational end state is a society that nurtures dissent sans the dread of surveillance-backlash, catalyzing comprehensive reforms in governance and human rights preservation.

Theory of Change

This transformative vision leans on a multi-pronged strategy embracing awareness-raising, legal action, international advocacy, and tech regulation:

Awareness-Raising: Amplifying the dark narrative of surveillance misuse to both Iranian citizens and the world at large, fostering a unified front in the fight for freedom.

Legal Action: Leveraging both domestic and global legal frameworks to contest human rights violations and vindicate the aggrieved, setting a legal bulwark against future transgressions.

International Pressure: Engaging the international community—ranging from global institutions to foreign states and the international populace—to pressurize Iran into aligning its surveillance practices with human rights norms.

2. Avenues for Action

Activists committed to pushing forward their agendas, armed with data on the application of surveillance tech like Tiandy's in Iran, have a plethora of strategies at their disposal to champion accountability, push for legal changes, and enhance public awareness. Here's a roadmap they might follow:

Utilizing Legal Avenues for Accountability

Domestic Legal Challenges: Navigating Iran's political landscape for legal recourse is daunting, yet activists can make a case within the judiciary, drawing on international commitments like the ICCPR, highlighting privacy breaches and more.

International Legal Mechanisms: By turning to UN entities such as the Human Rights Council or the Special Rapporteur on freedom of expression and presenting concrete evidence of abuses abetted by surveillance tools, activists can seek global attention and intervention.

Promoting Regulatory or Legal Reforms: For over 40 years, the Islamic Republic's governance has unfurled a narrative that, in recent times, starkly resembles internal colonialism. This model is one where stagnation and deceit reign supreme. Their strategy is twofold: to pull the wool over the eyes of international bodies and to hoodwink the very people they govern.

This is the crux of why efforts to inject reforms or promote regulatory changes into the fabric of this governance model have stumbled and fallen. The system is designed to resist alteration, to maintain the status quo at all costs. Change, no matter how desperately needed or passionately advocated for, finds no foothold. It's not just a failure of policies or reforms; it's a systemic repudiation of evolution.

Launching public advocacy campaigns is like lighting beacons of change, illuminating the path toward change with the help of social media, press involvement, and peaceful demonstrations, where it's possible. This approach isn't just about making noise; it's about forging a collective consciousness that craves systemic change. Taking a leaf from South Africa's book, where activists battled a government marred by internal colonialism, proves enlightening. Their strategies underscore the power of unified public advocacy against entrenched governance systems.

But it's not enough to simply call for change; we must be ready when the opportunity for change knocks. Activists do well to cultivate an environment ripe for systemic transformation. This involves laying the groundwork through workshops that build knowledge and skills, forums that encourage the exchange of ideas, and forming alliances with global human rights organizations. These efforts collectively build a vision for what could be, arming activists with the tools, connections, and strategies needed to seize those rare windows of opportunity. By investing in these preparatory measures, the movement for change becomes not just reactive but proactive, ready to leap at the chance to implement lasting systemic changes.

Leveraging global legal pathways, engaging in public advocacy, and shaping model laws, activists can lay the groundwork for eventual Changes. Documenting violations and championing rights, even in constrained settings, seeds the terrain for future change, contributing to the global conversation on privacy, surveillance, and human rights.

3. Red Team: Anticipated Critique and Response

In light of the intricate dynamics around Tiandy and its use of surveillance tech in Iran, particularly for stifling dissent and pinpointing protestors, various players involved are expected to employ numerous tactics to counteract public criticism or backlash. Here's a breakdown of potential reactions and strategies:

Networks' Response to Backlash:

Circling the Wagons: The Iranian authorities and their affiliates might staunchly defend their surveillance activities, framing them as crucial for national security and societal order. They're likely to highlight technology's role in battling crime and terrorism while sidestepping discussions on quashing dissent.

Attacking the Critics: Efforts to undermine detractors by painting them as unpatriotic or in cahoots with foreign adversaries are expected. This tactic seeks to shift focus from the critique by casting doubt on the accusers' intentions.

Sacrificing the Target: Should the backlash pose a significant risk to the regime's standing or its foreign relations, a strategy of pinning blame on minor officials or groups could be adopted, alleging unauthorized actions or misinterpretations of orders to calm the uproar without confessing to systematic misconduct.

Anticipated Criticism of Methodology, Sources, and Interpretation:

Methodological Criticism: The accusation may arise that the study over relies on dissident narratives or outlets biased against the Iranian government or China, challenging the findings' impartiality.

Source Criticism: Doubts could be cast on the authenticity or veracity of the data, especially if it stems from leaks or opposition factions.

Interpretative Criticism: Proponents of the regime might claim that depicting surveillance purely as a tool for suppression distorts its intent, neglecting its legitimate roles in law enforcement and public safety.

Rebuttal to Criticisms:

Methodological Robustness: Stressing the variety of sources reviewed, including global journalism, human rights documentation, and formal declarations, which together validate the conclusions drawn.

Source Verification: Pointing out the coherence across diverse reports and the leaked data's compatibility with known patterns of regime behavior and technology utilization.

Balanced Interpretation: While recognizing surveillance tech's lawful applications, provide unequivocal proof of its exploitation to curb peaceful protests and dissent, backed by firsthand accounts and independent scrutiny.

Expected Countermoves by Allies or the Regime:

Disinformation Campaigns: Propagating misleading narratives to challenge the study's integrity, potentially via social networks or state-run media.

Misdirection: Highlighting surveillance's positive aspects for public security, perhaps by showcasing instances where the technology effectively cracked criminal cases, to divert attention from its deployment against demonstrators.

Technical Obfuscation: Arguing that the implicated technologies don't possess the alleged capabilities, disputing the technical plausibility of extensive facial recognition and monitoring.

Mitigating Strategies:

Building a Broad Coalition: Partnering with global human rights entities, tech specialists, and community organizations to form a cohesive stance and reinforce the findings.

Transparent Methodology: Disclosing comprehensive details on the research approach, sources, and analytical procedures to bolster legitimacy and counter allegations of partiality or inaccuracies.

Engaging International Bodies: Advocating for the scrutiny of this matter by UN agencies or similar global organizations, utilizing their platforms for wider issue dissemination and validation.

By foreseeing these reactions and strategies, the goal is to bolster the research's durability and its conclusions against efforts to belittle or negate its significance, thus fostering a more enlightened and complex dialogue on the subject.

I. Implications for Future Research

1. Recommendations for New Leads or Expanded Research

In the context of Tiandy's deployment of surveillance technologies in Iran, especially for the suppression and identification of protesters, the need for a comprehensive approach to further investigate and amplify the impact of these findings is evident. This essay explores the multifaceted strategies that can be adopted to deepen the understanding of surveillance's role in oppression and to catalyze meaningful change.

Visual Documentation and Analysis

The visual documentation of Tiandy cameras in public spaces, particularly in areas known for protest activities, stands as a pivotal first step. This endeavor involves collecting visual evidence, utilizing satellite imagery, and geolocation tools to map the distribution of these surveillance devices. Such efforts aim not only to establish the factual presence of Tiandy's technology but also to provide a geographical context to its application, offering a tangible connection between surveillance infrastructure and areas of civil unrest.

Social Media Monitoring

Social media platforms, including Twitter, Instagram, Telegram, and local Iranian forums, emerge as rich sources of real-time information. These digital arenas allow for the monitoring of grassroots mobilization efforts, eyewitness accounts, and the direct impact of surveillance on individuals' daily lives and protest activities. By engaging with these platforms, researchers can gather a nuanced understanding of the community's perception of surveillance, its direct consequences on personal freedoms, and any emergent strategies to counteract or evade surveillance measures.

Technical Analysis of Surveillance Capabilities

A deep dive into the technical capabilities of Tiandy's surveillance technology, particularly its facial recognition systems and data processing capacities, requires collaboration with cybersecurity and surveillance technology experts. This analysis not only demystifies the operational capabilities of the technology but also identifies potential vulnerabilities that could be exploited to protect against unwarranted surveillance. Such technical scrutiny is essential for understanding the full extent of surveillance's intrusion into personal privacy and for formulating strategies to mitigate its impact. **(See Appendix D)**

Legal and Human Rights Documentation

Documenting legal cases where surveillance data has been used to target, detain, or prosecute individuals forms the backbone of legal and human rights advocacy. By gathering court documents, police statements, and testimonies from affected individuals, activists can build a compelling body of evidence highlighting the misuse of surveillance technology. This documentation serves not only as a tool for raising awareness but also as a foundation for legal challenges against the unjust application of surveillance.

International Trade and Sanctions Analysis

Investigating the international supply chains that facilitate the distribution of Tiandy's products, despite sanctions, uncovers the economic and logistical networks supporting its operations. This analysis reveals the complexities of global trade and the challenges of enforcing sanctions designed to prevent the export of surveillance technology to repressive regimes. By exposing these networks, activists can identify points of leverage to disrupt the supply of surveillance technologies used for oppression.

The strategic employment of visual documentation, social media monitoring, technical analysis, legal documentation, and international trade analysis offers a comprehensive approach to understanding and challenging the use of surveillance technologies in Iran. Each of these strategies provides a unique lens through which the impact of surveillance can be examined, documented, and contested. Collectively, they form a robust foundation for advocating for change, ensuring that efforts to amplify the findings of surveillance's role in oppression are grounded in evidence, technologically informed, legally substantiated, and globally aware. Through such a multifaceted approach, the aim is to foster a more informed public discourse, support affected individuals, and ultimately contribute to the development of policies and practices that respect personal freedoms and human rights. **(See Appendix E)**

IV. Methodology

This section deconstructs the methodology and anticipates/counters potential criticisms.

1. Sources Utilized

This exploration is taking a deep dive into the heart of surveillance dynamics within Iran, tapping into a rich blend of open-source media, social media platforms, technical analysis, and the invaluable insights of those directly affected or involved. By navigating local news sites alongside global platforms, you're drawing a comprehensive picture of the surveillance landscape and its implications on human rights within the region. The academic journals and technical publications provide a solid foundation, shedding light on the intricacies of facial recognition technologies and their pervasive reach.

Open-Source Media:

Source 1: Local news websites and international news platforms reporting on surveillance and human rights issues in Iran.

Source 2: Academic journals and technical publications on surveillance technologies, with a focus on facial recognition systems.

Social Media Platforms:

Source 3: Twitter and Instagram for real-time updates, using hashtags related to protests, surveillance, and digital rights in Farsi.

Source 4: Telegram channels and local forums where activists and residents discuss surveillance and share information.

Technical Analysis:

Source 5: Cybersecurity and technology research blogs that analyze surveillance cameras' technical aspects, including vulnerabilities and operational capabilities.

Human Sources:

Source 6: Interviews with activists, journalists, and experts on digital rights and surveillance, conducted anonymously to protect their identities. Interviews were conducted remotely, using secure communication channels.

Methods of Accessing Sources:

Data scraping tools: Employed for collecting data from social media platforms, with a focus on extracting relevant posts, images, and discussions using specific keywords and hashtags. Many of these resources are inaccessible without a filter breaker in Iran. And many of them are not well known.

2. Source Limitations

Research Limitations:

The research on Tiandy faced specific limitations, including:

1. Lack of transparent information on Tiandy's market entry to Iran.
2. Incomplete information on Tiandy's business partners in Iran.
3. Limited knowledge and non-transparent information on Tiandy's representation across cities in Iran.
4. Inadequate understanding of Tiandy's trade and investment in Iranian market, both with governmental entities and private companies.
5. Ambiguity surrounding the potential use of a database and image archive by the Islamic Regime to identify protesters through recorded videos from Tiandy cameras.
6. Lack of information on differentiation of traffic and surveillance cameras in different cities of Iran, specially in capital cities.
7. Insufficient information about the mechanism of using recorded videos from Tiandy cameras by security forces of the Islamic Republic, particularly the roles of the police and the Revolutionary Guard in utilizing these videos considering the size of demonstrations and the possibility of such protests spreading to other cities.

Importance of Research Findings:

The research findings can be valuable for the following groups:

1. Private companies aiming to avoid collaboration with Tiandy and its affiliated entities.
2. Small and medium-sized businesses wishing to avoid Tiandy's products.
3. Recipients of improper veiling messages can negate their presence in protests by being aware of Tiandy camera features.
4. Protesters in anti-government demonstrations can abstain from being present in areas where Tiandy cameras are likely installed.
5. International entities to increase restrictions on Tiandy and all its contracting parties and subsidiaries.

V. Appendix

A. Tiandy and Surveillance Cameras; Suppression and Identification of Protesters

In the year 1401 (2022-2023), Iran witnessed nationwide and widespread protests following the murder of Mahsa Amini by the Regime's Morality Police. With the expansion of such protests and the possibility of their resumption, the Islamic Republic of Iran also employs new methods to identify and suppress protesters in various Iranian cities, one of the most notable and widely used of which is the deployment of surveillance cameras throughout urban areas.

In this regard, various reports have been published in the past year about the installation of such cameras in Tehran and various cities in Iran. For instance, according to activists from

Sharif University of Technology, with the installation of new security cameras, the number of cameras on the university campus has now reached at least 60, with approximately 20 of them being 360-degree cameras.

The angle of image capture is crucial in facial recognition systems, and for accurate identification, it is necessary to capture the image from a head-on frontal angle of approximately 30 degrees. The distance from the camera is also important, and with an increase in distance, the margin of error in identification rises. If for any reason the lighting is not adequate, the error rate will increase.

However, it is essential to note that cameras installed in urban areas are generally divided into two categories: traffic cameras and surveillance cameras. Traffic cameras are used for controlling vehicles and transportation in general, while surveillance cameras serve a managerial and control role in urban spaces, such as controlling traffic volume and the general state of the city. The analysis of images captured by these cameras is usually performed by human operators. Current surveillance cameras installed in cities have the capability to monitor citywide events and transmit raw image data, but they lack intelligent processors for automatic facial recognition. According to the experts in the field, after the image data transmission, the data must be collected and each image be processed in a data center for facial recognition. Such a center would need to be exceptionally large to handle such vast amounts of received big data. The existence of such a massive data center in the country currently seems highly unlikely.

Government-affiliated media, especially those close to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) (Sepah-e Pasdaran), have reported extensively on their use of surveillance cameras to identify protesters and opponents of compulsory hijab. For example, Fars News Agency released a video in late Khordad 1402 (June 2023) on their social media platforms, showing plainclothes officers with masks and covered faces, admonishing and causing disturbances to women. It was later claimed that individuals who did not observe compulsory hijab were identified in these images and reported to judicial authorities.

In the mentioned published video, they had enlarged the faces of unveiled Iranian women, with their ID photos, their names and their national ID numbers placed above. Fars News Agency claimed that this information was obtained using artificial intelligence, and these individuals were introduced to judicial authorities.

Earlier, Mehr News Agency had released a video titled "High Precision Surveillance Camera Images from Public Places." The video showed a family sitting on the beach zooming in on an image of an unveiled woman who appeared to be identified by the camera. Similar to the Fars News video, this video also displayed a faded personal ID photo, information and a national ID number.

Ahmadreza Radan, the chief commander of Law Enforcement Command of the Islamic Republic of Iran, had previously threatened that using surveillance cameras and facial recognition, they would identify opponents of compulsory hijab and those removing their hijab. He also claimed in response to a question about the error rate of these cameras: "Rest assured, control cameras in the chastity and hijab project will have no errors."

In Farvardin 1402 (March-April 2023), the Islamic Republic Police officially had announced that they would use facial recognition smart systems to identify and deal with individuals not observing compulsory hijab. The police, in their statement published by their news outlet, described this action as an "initiative" to "prevent any tension and interference with fellow citizens in upholding the hijab law."

In this statement, the police stated: "By using intelligent tools and cameras in public places and thoroughfares, we will take action against individuals breaking {Islamic} norms. By sending proofs and warning messages to hijab law violators, we will inform them of the legal consequences of repeating this crime at the specified time and place."

In one of the most explicit positions on this matter, Mohammad Saleh Hashemi Golpayegani, the Secretary of the Headquarters for the Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of Vice, in Shahrivar 1401 (August-September 2022), stated in an interview that facial recognition technology will be used to identify inappropriate and abnormal behaviors and instances of neglecting the observance of hijab.

Some experts interpret the Islamic Republic's turn to "technology" in identifying opponents of compulsory hijab and opponents of the Islamic government as a government move from relying on informants and physical guidance patrols towards automatic digital surveillance for this purpose. This reflects a significant decrease in the political legitimacy of this government even among its traditional social bases, especially among the youth and adolescents of the country.

It could also be an indication that the Islamic regime's traditional and previous methods of repressing opponents on the streets have been virtually unable to put an end to the protests. On the contrary, it strengthened the courage of numerous citizens and various social groups in small and large cities in Iran to shout even louder slogans on the streets against the Islamic Republic, especially against Ali Khamenei, and to demand the overthrow of this government.

Tiandy in Different Countries

Since 2003, Tiandy company has initiated the export of its products to over fifty countries worldwide. Various media outlets have presented a list of Tiandy's projects in different countries, including 5-star hotels in Egypt, protected border areas between Turkey and Syria, national security projects in Ecuador, and customs in Turkey.

In 2020, among the top fifty renowned brands of CCTV camera systems worldwide, Tiandy secured the seventh position. In 2021, Tiandy's estimated revenue exceeded 800 million dollars.

Recent estimates indicate that over 540 million surveillance cameras have been installed in China. In other words, there is more than one surveillance camera for every three individuals in the country.

Tiandy: A Symbol of the Expansion of Cooperation between China and the Islamic Republic of Iran

In recent years, with the new foreign policy approach of the regime known as the "Look to the East," the level of cooperation between the Islamic Republic of Iran and two countries, China

and Russia, has significantly increased. These collaborations have spanned various areas, including trade, economy, security, and international relations.

For instance, in early Khordad 1401 (May 2022), Iranian and Chinese officials emphasized the strengthening of relations between Tehran and Beijing, particularly in the field of "security and police cooperation." According to experts, Tiandy has direct ties with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard, the law enforcement, and other security and quasi-military forces in Iran. It provides surveillance technologies for suppressing protesters, becoming a symbol of security relations between Tehran and Beijing.

One of the crucial turning points in the relations between Iran and China was the signing of the Comprehensive Cooperation Plan (Iran–China 25-year Cooperation Program) on the seventh day of Farvardin 1400 (March 2021). Mohammad Javad Zarif, the then Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Islamic Republic, signed the document alongside his Chinese counterpart, Wang Yi, at the Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Tehran. However, the history of the 25-year cooperation document between Iran and China dates back to 1394 (2015), and the meeting of the presidents of China and the Islamic Republic, where both emphasized the development and approval of a strategic cooperation document.

B. Tiandy: A Symbol of the Expansion of Cooperation between China and the Islamic Republic of Iran

Tiandy is a Chinese manufacturer specializing in surveillance technologies. According to official newspaper advertisements in Iran, Tiandy commenced its activities in Iran since 2006. It is worthy to mention many of Tiandy's products contain chips from the well-known Intel corporation, sales of which are restricted in Iran due to American sanctions. Tiandy company collaborates with various security and law enforcement sectors of the Islamic Regime. For instance, in an archived version of its website in Iran, Tiandy explicitly has mentioned the Islamic Revolutionary Guard of the regime as one of its clients. Moreover, it participated in the International Police, Security, and Safety Equipment Exhibition (IPAS) in Tehran in 2018.

While the title of the company and its products, Tiandy, does not appear in Iranian newspaper advertisements, public documents reveal that its official representative is Faragostar Electronic Iranians (Tiandy Iran). This company has been using Tiandy's logo in its marketing activities for the sale of Tiandy's products since 2006.

However, the founding advertisement of this company indicates that its founders are Farzad Nouri (CEO) and an individual named Babak Mir-Saeed Qazi. An online profile of Babak Mir-Saeed Qazi suggests that he is associated with institutions such as various divisions of the IRGC (such as the Joint Staff and the Naval Force), governmental entities, banks, and foundations like the Executive Headquarters and the Astan Qods-e Razavi, which is under the supervision of the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic.

In July 2023, it was reported in Iranian media that a gathering of the Tiandy extended family, including special representatives of Tiandy in Iran, Fartak Global Vision Company, Ati Negar Electronics, and all Tiandy representatives from different cities, was held at the Rayzan International Conference Centre in Tehran. During this gathering, Fartak Global Vision Company (Farko) was introduced as the new representative of Tiandy in Iran. Ati Negar Basir

Electronic, with a long history in the field of surveillance and security systems, was also introduced as the Gold Partner and business partner of Fartak Global Vision in the exclusive distribution of Tiandy brand products.

It is essential to note that Tiandy is one of the few companies whose products are used in large-scale projects such as refineries and large factories, as well as in medium-sized projects such as cameras in villas, small offices, and commercial units. Therefore, it has targeted a broad audience and has a significant presence in both small and medium-sized projects in Iran.

Capabilities of Tiandy and Its Use by the Security Institutions and National Security Council of the Islamic Republic

According to reports, Tiandy cameras possess capabilities that security institutions in countries such as the Islamic Republic of Iran and China extensively utilize.

Tiandy Iran claims that its cameras have various capabilities, including "intrusion detection," "crowd congestion detection alarm," "running detection alarm," "line crossing detection," "region entrance detection," and even "people counting capability."

The color night vision is another reason for the brand's significant sales worldwide. This feature allows detailed image observation and recording in low-light and even dark conditions.

Starlight technology is a noteworthy feature of Tiandy cameras that according to its official website, provides the ability to "take colorful image at almost dark" and can "capture the moving objects in almost totally dark scene with illumination as low as 0.0004Lux," a transformation labeled as "revolutionary" by the company.

This capability enables security forces, police, and military to record clear images of protesters in darkness, facilitating subsequent actions against them, such as arrest, torture, and le filing cases. The "crowd detection alarm" feature can separate protesters or people who gathered in a specific area, individually, making their identification easier .

Compression algorithms are another feature of Tiandy, with cameras ranging from 2MP to 16MP, PTZ cameras with zoom from 4 to 44 times, and NVR devices with 5 to 320 channels being only some of the products offered by Tiandy to the market.

Other features of Tiandy cameras and products include line crossing detection, two-way line crossing detection, object placement, object removal, subject escape, intrusion detection, abnormal sound detection, abnormal image detection, and intelligent fog removal.

C. Identification and Suppression of Protesters Using Cameras in Iran

With the expansion of anti-government protests in Iran, the authorities of the Islamic Republic are employing innovative methods, among which the use of surveillance cameras for the detection and identification of protesters in various cities of Iran is one of the most significant. Numerous reports have been published on this matter.

For instance, a leaked document stamped as "Highly Confidential" indicates that the Thar-Allah Headquarters of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), which plays a key role in suppressing anti-government protests, has requested the Islamic Republic government to

settle its debt for the installation of " Facial Recognition Security" cameras in the Tehran metro.

This document, obtained on the eighth of Khordad 1402 (May 29, 2023) through a cyberattack of the official website of the Iranian presidency by a hacking group called "Uprising Till Overthrow".

This document reveals that Thar-Allah Headquarters considers the Tehran metro as one of the "accident prone and vulnerable points in security conditions, especially during disturbances and riots" and emphasizes the necessity of renovating the monitoring system and closed-circuit cameras.

In this letter dated the 25th of Bahman, 1401 (February 14, 2023), from Hossein Najat, the deputy commander of the Thar-Allah Base, to Mohammad Mokhber, the first deputy of the president, it is stated that the financial claims of the Tehran metro operating company from the government until the end of the year 1400 amounted to approximately 3,295 billion tomans. According to this letter, the financial estimate for updating and renovating the closed-circuit cameras, including the 10 "Facial Recognition Security" cameras, is 1.55 billion tomans.

This security official in the Islamic Republic, who wrote this letter, has requested the government to pay serious attention to the Tehran metro to prevent any "anti-security incidents." According to him, the "obsolescence and low quality of the monitoring system and closed-circuit cameras in the Tehran metro have reduced their effectiveness in recent disturbances in the capital."

On the 13th of Dey, 1396 (January 3, 2018), Tasnim News Agency, close to the IRGC and security institutions, published a series of images of protesters captured by traffic cameras in front of the University of Tehran. Tasnim urged its readers to identify those individuals and report their information to security institutions. Following this call, several activists, including Leila Hosseinzadeh, whose image was published in Tasnim's report, were arrested and faced heavy sentences.

On the 2nd of Mehr, 1401 (September 14, 2022), the Gerdab website, affiliated with the "Organized Crime Investigation Center" of the Revolutionary Guard, published videos and images of dozens of protesters recorded by surveillance cameras. The website called for the identification of these individuals. These images were captured by a set of surveillance cameras, including traffic control cameras and security cameras belonging to government buildings.

About two weeks later, during the peak of the bloody suppression of the "Women, Life, Freedom" movement, Hassan Karami, the commander of the Special Unit of the Police of the Islamic Republic of Iran, announced that his forces were using various types of cameras and drones to identify protesters or direct suppression forces.

In early Aban 1401 (October 2022), Mehr News Agency, belonging to the Islamic Propagation Organization, released a video showing the use of a drone by special forces to identify and suppress protesters. In this video, the drone operator is seen alongside a special forces sniper, and then images of protesters recorded by the drone are shown, followed by some of the

detained protesters. These images demonstrate the fact that visual surveillance equipment such as closed-circuit cameras and image-capturing drones have directly become tools for suppression, detention, and even the killing of protesters in the hands of security forces.

D. Capabilities of Tiandy and Its Use by the Security Institutions and National Security Council of the Islamic Republic

According to reports, Tiandy cameras possess capabilities that security institutions in countries such as the Islamic Republic of Iran and China extensively utilize.

Tiandy Iran claims that its cameras have various capabilities, including "intrusion detection," "crowd congestion detection alarm," "running detection alarm," "line crossing detection," "region entrance detection," and even "people counting capability."

The color night vision is another reason for the brand's significant sales worldwide. This feature allows detailed image observation and recording in low-light and even dark conditions.

Starlight technology is a noteworthy feature of Tiandy cameras that according to its official website, provides the ability to "take colorful image at almost dark" and can "capture the moving objects in almost totally dark scene with illumination as low as 0.0004Lux," a transformation labeled as "revolutionary" by the company.

This capability enables security forces, police, and military to record clear images of protesters in darkness, facilitating subsequent actions against them, such as arrest, torture. The "crowd detection alarm" feature can separate protesters or people who gathered in a specific area, individually, making their identification easier .

Compression algorithms are another feature of Tiandy, with cameras ranging from 2MP to 16MP, PTZ cameras with zoom from 4 to 44 times, and NVR devices with 5 to 320 channels being only some of the products offered by Tiandy to the market.

Other features of Tiandy cameras and products include line crossing detection, two-way line crossing detection, object placement, object removal, subject escape, intrusion detection, abnormal sound detection, abnormal image detection, and intelligent fog removal.

To examine and categorize Tiandy products, various methods can be considered. For example, based on one of the classifications, Tiandy products can be categorized into three groups:

- The first category is called the Lite series; they are very cost-effective, their installation is simple, they can be used for retail groups and are often used in places such as warehouses, parking lots, parks, and residential areas.

- The second group is the Pro or Professional series; it has a more optimized application compared to the previous group; it has more analytical features; it provides clearer and more vivid images; it is often used in small and medium-sized projects.

-The third group is Ultra; designed for the advanced market and projects, their image production structure and infrastructure are very strong and advanced, they have the capability of face detection. Tiandy itself often introduces its products with this type of classification.

ULTRA series camera models: ([LINK](#))

Tiandy TC-C35LQ Spec: I8W/E/A/2.8-12mm 5MP Starlight Motorized EW Bullet Camera (2.8-12mm)

Tiandy TC-C35MQ Spec: I3W/E/A/2.8-12mm 5MP Starlight Motorized EW Dome IP Camera (2.8-12mm)

Tiandy TC-A32E2 Spec: 2/E/12mm 2MP New Advanced Starlight Face Capture Bullet Camera

Tiandy TC-A32E4 Face Recognition Spec: 1/E/12mm 2MP New Advanced Starlight Bullet Camera

Tiandy TC-A32F2 Spec: 2/E/6mm 2MP New Advanced Starlight Face Capture Turret Camera

Tiandy TC-A32F4 Spec: 1/E/6mm 2MP New Advanced Starlight Face Recognition Turret Camera

Tiandy TC-H389M Spec: 44X/LW/P/A 8MP 44X Super Starlight Laser AEW Panoramic PTZ Camera

Tiandy TC-A3563 Spec: 44X/I/A 5MP 44x New Super Starlight IR Face Capture AEW PTZ Camera

Tiandy TC-C32BG Spec: I5W/E/4mm 2MP New Super Starlight EW Bullet Camera

Tiandy TC-C34LP Thermal Spec: I5/E/T/4mm New Advanced Thermal & Optical Bi-spectrum Bullet Camera

Tiandy TC-C35BQ Spec: I5W/E/4mm 5MP New Advanced Starlight EW Bullet Camera

Tiandy TC-H3169M Spec: 44X/LW/P/A 16MP 44x New Super Starlight Laser AEW Panoramic PTZ Camera

Tiandy TC-H326M Spec:44X/IW/A 2MP 44x New Super Starlight IR AEW AI PTZ Camera

Tiandy TC-H358M Spec-44X-IT-A 5MP 44x New Advanced Thermal & Optical Bi-spectrum AI PTZ Camera

Tiandy TC-H358M Spec: 44X/IL/A 5MP 44x New Super Starlight IR Laser AEW AI PTZ Camera

Tiandy TC-NC1261 12MP IR Fisheye Camera

This company is not the only one helping the Islamic Republic. During our research we found the names of other companies and institutions, the list of which is provided. By investigating the relationships between these companies and examining their financial exchange systems, we can begin to understand the financial and business networks of these companies.

Companies supplying monitoring and identification equipment:

1. Tiandy Technologies CO ([Link](#))
2. Radis Vera Trade Co ([Link](#))
3. Pars Communication" company ([Link](#))
4. Faragostar Persia Electronics Co ([Link](#))
5. Persia System company ([link](#))
6. Sepehr Sanat Company ([Link](#))
7. Rayan Datis Campaign Company ([Link](#))
8. "Afradid Irsa" company ([Link](#))
9. Iran Nutrica ([Link](#))
10. "Sahba Horizon" company ([Link](#))
11. Basir Electro Robot Co ([Link](#))

Suppression equipment supplier companies:

1. JINO Motors CO., Ltd
2. (Dalian Eagle Sky) Company ([link](#))
3. Iran-Hatsan Airguns ([Link](#))
4. "Akar" Arms Manufacturing Company
5. Fox Armour CO Ltd
6. Imen sanat zaman fara Company
7. Entebagh Gostar Company ([Link](#))
8. Naji Pass Company ([Link](#))
9. ZTE Compay ([Link](#))
10. HikVision Company



جزئیات آگهی

شماره روزنامه: ۱۸۵۵۲ تهران

شماره صفحه روزنامه:

تاریخ روزنامه: ۱۳۸۷/۸/۱۶

شماره نامه اداره ثبت: ۳۲/۳/۶۲۶۳۲

تاریخ نامه اداره ثبت:

شماره پیکری روزنامه رسمی: ۵۴۸

آگهی تقاضای ثبت علامت تجاری



دفتر بین المللی وکالت و مشاوره حقوقی دکتر علی لسانی و همکاران ساکن تهران خیابان ولیعصر، کوچه شهید عاطفی، پلاک ۲۷ (ساختمان کیمیا) ، طبقه سوم بوکالت:

Hangzhou Hikvision Digital Technology Co., Ltd
Macheng Road, Xihu District, Hangzhou, China ۳۶

بموجب اظهارنامه شماره ۸۷۰۵۲۴۵۴ مورخ ۲۰/۵/۱۳۸۷ تقاضای ثبت علامت فوق را که عبارت است از کلمه HIK VISION به صورت فانتزی طبق نمونه پیوست، جهت دستگاه پردازش دنیا، انواع مدار مجتمع؛ انواع تابلوی اعلانات الکترونیک، انواع تلن تصویری، انواع دستگاه الکترونیک جهت دزدگیر، دوربین فیلمبرداری ویدئو و تلوریزون، انواع ماشین آتش نشانی، انواع سیم الکترونیک، دستگاه ضبط مسافت، انواع دوربین (عکاسی) ، دستگاه ایمنی جهت رفت و آمد برخطوط راه آهن، انواع باتری با تاووم بالا، صفحات رادیوآلوزی جهت مصارف صنعتی ، دستگاه تلگرافی - عکاسی؛ برنامه کاری الکترونیک در طبقه ۹ نموده است. مراتب جهت اطلاع عموم آگهی می‌گردد. معترضین می‌توانند ظرف سی روز از تاریخ انتشار این آگهی اعتراض خود را در دو نسخه به این اداره تسلیم دارند.

اداره مالکیت صنعتی

آگهی‌های قانونی | فروشگاه محصولات | قوانین و مقررات | اشتراک محصولات | ورود کاربران | ثبت نام

تمامی حقوق این پورتال برای روزنامه رسمی کشور محفوظ است.

آدرس: تهران؛ ضلع جنوبی پارک شهر؛ خیابان بهشت؛ جنب شورای اسلامی شهر تهران اتلفن گویا: 55602050



جزئیات آگهی

شماره روزنامه: ۲۲۲۰۴ تهران

شماره صفحه روزنامه: ۴۹

تاریخ روزنامه: ۱۳۰۰/۳/۲۳

شماره نامه اداره ثبت: ۱۴۰۰۵۰۸۴۰۰۰۱۱۷۱۳

تاریخ نامه اداره ثبت: ۱۳۹۳/۵/۱۳

آگهی ثبت انتقال علامت تجاری

برابر تقاضای ورده شماره ۱۱۹۲۶۶۵۰۶۴۰۰۰۱۱۹۲۶۶۵ مورخ ۱۲/۱۲/۱۳۹۹ شرکت ابوغراله للملکة الفکرية نی ام بی اجنتس وکیل مالک به شماره ۲۱۵۶۹۹ کلمه eZVIZ به لاتین، نوشته شده با حروف بزرگ به غیر از حرف اول کلمه، طبق نمونه، در طبقات: ۹، ۲۸، ۳۲، ۳۵ از طبقه بندی بین المللی کالاها و خدمات که به ضمیمه اسناد مربوطه و ترجمه گواهی شده آنها بوده است، باستحضار میرساند علامت مزبور: از: شرکت هانگزو هیکویرن دیجیتال تکنالوجی کو، ال نی دی، ۱۰۰٪ (Hangzhou Hikvision Digital Technology Co., Ltd) به: شرکت هانگزو ایزو نتورک کو، ال نی دی، ۱۰۰٪ (Hangzhou Ezviz Network CO., Ltd) ساختمان ۲، ساختمان ۳، شماره ۳۹۹، دانفنگ رود، هانگکو، چین به نشانی: ۳۱۰۵۲ هانگزو چین، بینجیانگ دیستریکت، دانفنگ رود، شماره ۳۹۹، ساختمان ۲، ساختمان ۳، واحد ۳۰۱ تابعیت: چین انتقال یافته، مراتب در سوابق ثبت و ظهور گواهینامه تمدید علامت فید و جهت اطلاع عموم آگهی میشود .



جزئیات آگهی

شماره روزنامه: ۱۷۰۷۸ تهران

شماره صفحه روزنامه:

تاریخ روزنامه: ۱۳۸۲/۷/۲۳

شماره نامه اداره ثبت: ۳۲/۳۰/۲۷۶۷۲

تاریخ نامه اداره ثبت:

شماره پیگیری روزنامه رسمی: ۳۵۸۹۵

آگهی تقاضای ثبت علامت تجاری

دفتر بین المللی وکالت و مشاوره حقوقی دکتر علی لقانی و همکاران ساکن تهران، خیابان ولیعصر، محمودیه، شماره ۱۶۰۲/۲، ساختمان بیک، طبقه سوم، بوکالت از طرف:

ZTE CORPORATION
ZTE Plaza, Keji Road South
Hi-Tech Industrial Park
Nanshan District, Shenzhen
P.R. China

بموجب اظهارنامه شماره ۸۲۰۶۷۸۲ مورخ ۲۲/۶/۸۲ تقاضای ثبت علامت را که عبارت است از حروف ZTE طبق نمونه جهت: تجهیزات بکارانداختن تلفن SPC، دستگاه فشرده، تجهیزات آموزش سمعی-بصری، مولد برق با ولتاژ پائین، انواع باتری، دستگاه شارژ باتری، سیستمهای هشداردهنده، مودم، تجهیزات ارتباط نوری، وسایل فعال کننده ایستگاههای نیروی الکتریکی، تجهیزات کنترل از راه دور نیروی الکتریکی، انواع صفحه نمایش (سخت افزار کامپیوتر)، تجهیزات و وسایل اندازه گیری الکتریکی، تجهیزات باربینی الکتریکی، تجهیزات کنترل از راه دور صنعتی، دستگاه یکسوکننده جریان برق، یکسوکننده، دستگاه مدل (الکتریکی)، دستگاه فرستنده (علامت الکترونیکی)، دستگاه فرستنده (ارتباط از راه دور)، دستگاه رادیوفون، نرم افزارهای کامپیوتر (صیغ شده)، برنامه های ضبط شده کامپیوتری، دستگاه تلفن (علاوه بر گوشی)، انواع کامپیوتر، دستگاههای جانبی کامپیوتر، نیمه رساناها، مدارهای مجتمع، قطعات مدارهای مجتمع، ویدئوفون، رابطها (دستگاههای پردازش داده ها)، دستگاههای پردازش پیام (دستگاههای پردازش مرکزی)، انواع حساسه، کابلهای برق، کابلهای تلفن، وسایل اطلاعات نوری، وسایل اطلاعات مغناطیسی، دستگاه ذخیره برای کامپیوتر، ردیاب، وسایل اندازه گیری، سیستمهای کنفرانس تصویری، دستگاههای کنترل چند نقطه ای برای کنفرانسهای تصویری (MCU)، سیستمهای تلفن همراه، دستگاه تعیین و ثبت موقعیت و مکان خانه (HLR)، کنترل کننده های ساکن و مستقر در یک جایگاه، دستگاههای فرستنده و گیرنده ساکن و مستقر در یک جایگاه، سیستمهای نظارت منطبق برای محیطها و تجهیزات نیرو، اتاقهای کنترل کننده محیط، تجهیزات جهت دستیابی به شبکه، سیستم IP برای درهای ورودی، کلیه کالاهای مذکور در طبقه ۹ را نموده است مراتب برای اطلاع عموم آگهی می گردد، معترضین می توانند طرف مدی روز از تاریخ انتشار این آگهی اعتراض خود را در دو نسخه به این اداره تسلیم نمایند.

اداره مالکیت صنعتی

i.

E. Sanctions Against Tiandy

In late Azar 1401 (December 2022), the United States imposed sanctions on the Chinese company Tiandy due to its sale of surveillance cameras to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and its role in the suppression of Uyghur Muslims in China. These sanctions prevent American companies from selling and exporting equipment to this entity.

It is worthy to mention that also the processors used in Tiandy's network video systems were supplied by Intel, the American computer hardware giant. Before announcing the sanctions, Intel removed the name of Tiandy as one of its business partners from its website.

Before the announcement of the sanctions, Senator Marco Antonio Rubio, the Republican representative from Florida, expressed concerns in a letter to President Joe Biden about Tiandy's commercial cooperation with the institutions and officials of the Islamic Republic and the use of its products against Iranian protesters. He had called for detailed investigations into these matters.

A report from the U.S. Treasury Department also mentioned the use of Chinese facial recognition technology in Iran, specifically citing its use in the Revolutionary Guard's Hazrat-e Abbas based in Ardabil province as one of the prominent cases.

Among 5 other projects in Iran, it collaborated with the Social Security Organization (SSO) of the Armed Forces in Qom and Zanjan provinces. In Gilan, Tiandy was praised by the Criminal Investigation Department of the Law Enforcement Force of Khomam County as a successful project. Also in Markazi province, Tiandy mentioned its involvement in the Cooperative Foundation of Prisoners' Technology as one of its projects.

In February 2023, the European Union sanctioned Radis Vira Tejarat Company and its manager for violating human rights by selling Tiandy's surveillance cameras in Iran. This company, as the official representative of Tiandy in Iran, is involved in importing and selling surveillance equipment to entities such as the IRGC, law enforcement, and the Basij.

The European Union cited Radis Vira Tejarat Company as a key intermediary in providing advanced surveillance equipment to the Islamic Regime of Iran.

Additionally, Abbas Azarpendar, the regional manager of Tiandy in Iran, and the founder and CEO of Radis Vira Tejarat Company were added to the EU's list of sanctions for their roles in suppressing the protesters of the "Women, Life, Freedom" revolutionary movement and violating the human rights of these protesters.

F. Reference

1. Introduction of Ati Nagar Electronics Company ([Link](#))
2. Features of Tiandy products ([Link](#))
3. Super Starlight ([Link](#))
4. Tiandy's Iran Business, Sells to Revolutionary Guard And Military ([Link](#))
5. Iran sought a surveillance project with 'unprecedented' reach ([Link](#))
6. Tiandy's projects ([Link](#))